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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES E. PITTS and 







Case No. 14454 
APPELLANTS1 BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff to have a paved alley-
way across defendant's land declared a public thoroughfare or 
to have defendant's land declared subject to a prescriptive 
easement for plaintiffs' use of said alleyway and to prohibit 
the defendant from blocking said alleyway. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court. The Court filed two 
Memorandum Decisions and defendant prepared Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment for the defendant therefrom 
from which plaintiffs appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the Judgment of the Trial 
Court and Judgment in their favor as a matter of law, or fail-
ing that, a new trial. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The record on appeal consists of two volumes and an 
envelope containing exhibits. All references to the volume 
comprised of the pleadings, minute entries and similar 
papers are designated by the letter "R". All references to 
the volume consisting of the transcript of the testimony and 
proceedings held June 10, 1975, are designated by the letter 
"T". Exhibits are referred to by the number assigned by the 
trial court. 
This action involves the right to use an alleyway 
which runs East and West between Emery Street (1170 West) 
and Concord Street (1255 West) at approximately 420 South in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
In 1890 the Golden Park Subdivision and the Amended 
Plat Golden Park were recorded with the Salt Lake County 
Recorder (Pps 36,39, Exhibit 1-d). The Jordan Place Subdivi-
sion was recorded shortly thereafter and both subdivisions, 
as far as this action is concerned, are shown on the official 
plat of the Salt Lake County Recorder known as the NW 1/4 
SW 1/4 Section 2, Township 1 South, Range 1 West (Exhibit 2-P). 
This plat depicts the alleyway in question as being 16 feet 
in width running eastward from Concord Street until it reaches 
defendant's property, Lots 1 and 13, Amended Plat Golden Park, 
where said plat shows the alleyway narrowing to 6 feet in width. 
Proceeding chronologically the history of the alleyway 
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is as follows: In 1920 the alleyway Iwest] from Emery Street 
was the same width as it is today (T 81) and the surface was 
gravel (T 81). It was used by everyone in the area (T 81). 
Between 1920 and 1936 a family named Potter operated a public 
garage for repairing and painting of cars on the east end of 
the alley (T 82, T 84, T 87, Exhibit 13-d), with the primary 
entrance way off of the alleyway (T 87). 
In 1936 the alleyway was gravel and cinders (T 95) and 
was still being used by Potters Garage (T 95) as well as coal 
trucks making deliveries (T 95), movement of cows (T 95), 
delivery of hay (T 95) and general usage by the public (T 82) . 
In 1946, plaintiffs and appellants Charles and Ethel 
Pitts purchased a house located at 423 Concord Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, and they have lived there to the present 
time (T 62). At said time the alleyway was a graveled road 
(T 63) and plaintiffs traveled the entire length of the alley-
way (T 63) almost every day except when their truck was out 
of service (T 66) . 
Sometime prior to 1952 the alleyway was paved west from 
Emery Street to Potters Garage (T 83) which blacktop was across 
defendant's property (Exhibit 13-d). Between 1950 and 1954 
(T 68, T 85) the entire length of the alley was paved with 
blacktop by Salt Lake City Street Department (T 96, T 97) and 
has existed in a similar condition to the present time (T 52, 
Exhibit 3-P). 
When the alleyway was paved by the City Street Depart-
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ment the blacktop was placed so that at the easterly end of 
the alleyway from 6 feet to 8 feet of defendant's property 
was covered with the paving material (Exhibit 3-P). The 
alleyway has remained in the same general condition since the 
paving (T 70). 
Since 1952 to the time of trial the paved alleyway has 
been used daily by plaintiff (T 66), various automobiles 
(T 98, T 114), children coming from school (T 85) and playing 
on bicycles (T 65, T 85), motor scooters (T 65), motorcycles 
(T 85), tenants of apartments on the alleyway (T 90), as well 
as landowners abutting the alleyway (T 81, T 96). None of 
these parties obtained permission from anyone to use said 
alleyway (T 66, T 83, T 96). 
At one time there was a dedicated alleyway running 
north and south between Fourth South Street and the subject 
alleyway just West of defendant's property (Exhibits 2-P and 
3-P). Said alleyway was vacated in December of 1952 (Exhibits 
7-d and 9-d). Said side alleyway was not used by vehicular 
traffic prior to December of 1952 (T 75, T 77) and has power 
poles down the center thereof (T 77, T 78), was covered with 
weeds (T 89) and was not used by anyone (T 86) except for power 
line maintenance (T 87). 
In June of 1971 defendant and respondent Leo Roberts 
moved into the house located at 420 Emery Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, and he has lived there to the present time (T 109). 
When he moved into said house he had a survey made (Exhibit 6-d) 
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which shows, by scale that there was an 8-foot wide asphalt 
walkway to the south of his house. Defendants house faces 
south (T 112) and he was able to see the alleyway from his 
front door (T 112) and observed daily vehicular traffic upon 
said paved alleyway (T 114). 
On occasion since defendant moved into his present 
residence he has blocked the alleyway with trash cans (T 114) 
and his automobile (T 115) for varying lengths of time but 
has never put a permanent blockade in the alley (T 116). 
Defendant asserts that he owns the alleyway property 
and is entitled to a Decree quieting title to said property 
(R 6). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE ACQUIRED A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT 
IN THE ALLEYWAY ACROSS DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY BY 
CONTINUOUS USE OVER A PERIOD EXCEEDING 20 YEARS. 
The requirements for obtaining a prescriptive easement 
are set out clearly in 4 TIFFANY REAL PROPERTY (3rd Edition) 
§1191 at page 960, as follows: 
"To acquire easement over land by pre-
scription it is necessary to show use: 
1. Adverse to the owner. 





7. For the period of prescription." 
The Utah Supreme Court has followed said requirements 
in Richins v. Struhs, 17 Utah 2d 356, 412 P.2d 314, wherein 
the court further stated at page 315: 
"The origin and purpose of their [pre-
scriptive rights] recognition arises 
out of the general policy of the law of 
assuring the peace and good order of 
society by leaving a long established 
status quo at rest rather than by distri-
buting it. In order to serve this purpose, 
when a claimant has shown that a use has 
existed peaceably and without interfer-
ance for the prescriptive period of 20 
years, the law presumes that the use is 
adverse to the owner; and that it had a 
legitimate origin." 
Rights of easement by prescription have at all times 
been recognized in Utah. The time required for an easement 
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to ripen by adverse use has been set at 20 years by the Utah 
Supreme Court. See Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 P. 1127 
(1916) and Anderson v. Osguthorpe, 29 Utah 2d 32, 504 P.2d 
1000 (1972). 
Plaintiffs have testified, and their testimony is 
supported by other witnesses and is totally uncontroverted, 
that they have used the alleyway openly and continuously since 
1946 (T 65) and that the only interruption to said use came in 
1971 when defendant temporarily blocked said alleyway (T 67). 
Said usage well exceeds the 20 year prescriptive period by 
five years, thereby raising the presumption that said use 
was adverse to the owner. 
The claim of right to use the alleyway asserted by the 
plaintiff is that the alleyway was apparently and obviously 
a graveled passageway open to use by the general public. No 
permission was sought from anyone to use said alleyway nor 
was any received (T 66). Between 1946 and 1966 the prescrip-
tive period was well established prior to defendant's blocking 
the alleyway and temporarily interrupting the use thereof 
subsequent to 1971. Once the prescriptive use is established 
it follows with the land and future owners are bound thereby. 
Uncontroverted testimony of two witnesses established 
the paving of the alleyway between 1950 and 1954 (T 68, T 83). 
The period between said date and the filing of the complaint 
in this action in September of 1974 is more than adequate for 
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the 20-year prescriptive period. The City in paving the 
alleyway recognized the public good in the use thereof and 
has since recognized that vehicular traffic was to use said 
alley by placing a drive approach to said alleyway in the 
new curb and gutter installed on Concord and Emery Streets 
(T 53, Exhibits 3-P, 5-P). 
Argument was made by defendantfs counsel at trial that 
plaintiffs had personally used the alley for a period of only 
17 years. Said argument was opposed by plaintiffs1 counsel 
on the basis that said position was not supported by facts 
presented at trial. The trial court in its second Memorandum 
Decision (R 28) states that plaintiffs have shown only 17 
years use of the alleyway and said statement was incorporated 
into the Findings of Fact executed by the Court (R 37, H8). 
A careful and exhaustive analysis of the transcript does not 
disclose any basis for said finding in plaintiffs1 testimony 
or in the testimony of any of the witnesses and it is submitted 
that said finding is in error and that plaintiffs have used 
said alleyway in excess of 20 years and has thereby obtained a 
prescriptive easement to the continued use thereof. 
POINT II 
PUBLIC USE OF THE ALLEYWAY FOR A PERIOD IN 
EXCESS OF TEN YEARS HAS ESTABLISHED A PUBLIC 
HIGHWAY BY USE ACROSS DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY. 
"Public use constituting dedication. - a 
highway shall be deemed to have been dedi-
cated and abandoned to the use of the public 
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when it has been continuously used as a 
public thoroughfare for a period of ten 
vears." Utah Code Annotated 27-12-89 
Repl. (1953) 
The trial court in its Memorandum Decision (R 11) held 
that plaintiffe did not comply with the above statute in that 
testimony as to the public use of the alley came only from 
abutting property owners. The court based its decision upon 
Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 438 P.2d 545 (1968). Said 
case held at page 377 that "furthermore it was not alleged 
that any member or members of the general public used the road, 
save the property owners in this area. Such property owners 
cannot be considered members of the public generally, as that 
term is used in dedication by user's statutes/1 
The case before the court can clearly be distinguished 
from Petersen v. Combe. It is true that the testimony in 
this matter came solely from property owners abutting the 
alley. However, their testimony was to the effect that not 
only they used the alley without permission but that it was 
used by general vehicular traffic (T 114), children on the 
way to school (T 85), couples on motor scooters and for 
garbage collection (T 65), delivery of coal,(T 95), driving 
and pasturing of cows and delivery of hay (T 95), and was used 
by the public for entrance to a garage and repair shop (T 95). 
While the court in Petersen v. Combe upbraided the 
plaintiffs1 witnesses as being property owners abutting and 
straddling the road in question and "having deraigned title 
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directly or indirectly from homesteader Michael Combe", 
20 Utah 2d 376, 378; 438 P.2d 545, 547, the court did go on 
to say that these property owners "could testify as to what 
others not so situate might have done to perfect a dedication.,." 
op cit., supra. The witnesses in the present case/ being 
abutting property owners; were in a prime location to testify 
as to use of the alleyway by the general public. Said use by 
the general public extended from the 1920,s to the time of 
trial when a 12-unit apartment house was being constructed on 
the alley with parking for tenants and guests only accessible 
from the alleyway (T 70). 
In Clark v. Erekson, 9 Utah 2nd 212, 341 P.2d 424 
(1959), the court held that testimony by witnesses establish-
ing that a lane had been used by the general public either by 
walking or riding in wagons and later in automobiles and by 
people either going to church or to fish in the creek at the 
end of the road was sufficient to establish a dedication by 
public use. It is submitted that similar testimony has been 
submitted in the within case and that the finding of fact 
entered by the court (paragraph 2 of R 37) is not supported 
by the evidence adduced at trial. 
The fact that the testimony of the witnesses could 
specify the identity of only a relatively few members of the 
general public using the alleyway is insufficient to find 
that there has not been a dedication by public user, Boyer v, 
Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395, 326 P.2d 107 (1958) held that a contin-
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uous use for a period exceeding 50 years, even though not 
consisting of a great many persons, \<?as sufficient as a 
matter of law to establish a highway by dedication. Witnesses 
at the trial testified that although the alleyway was used by 
"everyone" (T 85) that specific identity of public members 
were limited to those who could be readily identified. 
Plaintiffs1 contention that a public highway has been 
established over and across said alleyway is amply supported 
by the fact that the City, in recognition of the public use 
of said highway has paved the alleyway (T 96) and has placed 
said pavement over and across the southerly 6 to 8 feet of 
defendants land since the previously existing gravelled 
alleyway crossed said same portion of defendant's land (T 62). 
It is submitted that the public use of the alley, along with 
the recognition of the public use of said alleyway by the 
Salt Lake City Streets Department is sufficient under the 
provisions of Section 27-12-89, Utah Code Annotated, 1953/ 
to establish a public highway across defendant's property. 
POINT III 
NECESSITY IS NOT A REQUIREMENT FOR 
ESTABLISHMENT OF A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT. 
The trial court in paragraphs of its Findings of Fact 
stated, 
"6. That the evidence presented is 
absolutely lacking as to any evidence 
or necessity for use of said strip of 
property by plaintiffs." (R 37) 
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Said finding is presumably based upon the Memorandum Decision 
of the court dated June 11, 1975, (R 12) and is founded on the 
case of Thompson v. Nelson, 2 Utah 2d 340, 273 P. 2d 720 (1954). 
An analysis of Thompson indicates that three claims were 
submitted by appellant for decision by the Supreme Court, said 
claims being outlined at page 340 as follox^ s: 
"Appellant claims (1) an easement by pre-
scription; (2) that a public road exists over 
said 14 feet of the Thompson property; (3) 
that it has an implied right of way over 
said 14 feet." 
The question of an easement by prescription presented 
as item 1 for consideration by the court was decided against 
the appellant on the basis that appellant ffdid not, during 
any period of 20 years, continuously, uninterruptedly, or 
adversely travel over the east 14 feet of the Thompson pro-
perty." 2 Utah 2d 340, 342, 273 P.2d 720, 722. Thus, the 
court quickly dispensed with appellant's claim of prescriptive 
easement and went on to discuss item 3 relating to implied 
easements. It was in regards to the court's discussion of 
the implied easement that the court stated on page 343 of its 
decision that the essential elements of an implied easement 
are: 
"1. A separation of title; 
2. Necessity that, before the separation 
takes place, the use which gives rise 
to the easement shall have been so long 
continued and obvioused or manifest as 
to show that it was meant to be permanent; 
and 
3. Necessity that the easement be essential 
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to the beneficial enjoyment of the 
land granted or retained.11 
Necessity, therefore, as required by the trial court 
in its Memorandum Decision and in its finding of fact, re-
lates solely to an implied easement, and an implied easement, 
relates to the condition of a separation of title. Since a 
separation of title is not in question before the court in 
the present case and an implied easement has not been presented 
or argued, the element of necessity is inapplicable to the 
matter before the court. 
The court clearly defines the difference between a 
flway of necessity" and a "prescriptive right of way11 in the 
case of Savage v. Nielsen, 114 Utah 22, 197 P. 2d 117 (1948). 
The court stated at page 32, lfa way of necessity arises from 
the existence of such necessity at the time of the dividing 
of the property. A right of way by prescription can only be 
obtained by satisfying certain other requirements. These 
requirements may, for all practical purposes, be included 
within the three set out below, although the cases under 
particular fact situation have emphasized other subdivisions. 
The three uses are: (1) continuous; (2) open; and (3) adverse 
under a claim of right.11 Under the requirements of Savage, 
it is not necessary that plaintiff prove necessity for the 
use of the alleyway and it is apparent that he has met the 
continuous, open and adverse under a claim of right require-
ments established by said case. 
1 Q _ 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs1 witnesses, some who have lived in the area 
of the alleyway in question since 1920, and all who have lived 
there since 1946, have given uncontroverted testimony as to 
the use of the alleyway by the general public for more than 
ten.years. Plaintiff has given uncontroverted testimony that 
he has personally used the alleyway across the defendant's 
property from 1946 to 1974, well in excess of the 20-year 
prescriptive easement requirements. These two facts when 
viewed with the fact that Salt Lake City paved the alleyway 
over 20 years ago, clearly and unequivocably leads to the 
conclusion that the south 8 feet of defendant's property is 
(1) a public highway by use, or (2) subject to a prescriptive 
easement for plaintiffs1 use, and the court is requested to 
make such a decision. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT C. LILJENQUIST 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants 
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